Effects of decision-making on the transport costs across complex
  networks by Gourley, Sean & Johnson, Neil F.
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/0
60
41
48
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  1
8 A
pr
 20
06
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Abstract
We analyse the effects of agents’ decisions on the creation of congestion on a cen-
tralised network with ring-and-hub topology. We show that there are two classes of
agents each displaying a distinct set of behaviours. The dynamics of the system are
driven by an interplay between the formation of, and transition between, unique
stable states that arise as the network is varied. We show how the flow of objects
across the network can be understood in terms of the ordering and allocation of
strategies. Our results show that the existence of congestion in a network is a dy-
namic process that is as much dependent on the agents’ decisions as it is on the
structure of the network itself.
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1 Introduction
Understanding how motorists’ individual decisions affect the traffic patterns
which emerge on road networks, is of great practical importance [1]. It also
represents a fascinating theoretical problem from the point of view of transport
on networks. Indeed, the study of the functional properties of networks is
gaining increased attention across a range of disciplines [1,2,3,4]. Of particular
interest is the fact that congestion at various critical points on the network can
dramatically reduce the efficiency of the network. Ashton et al have presented
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an exactly solvable model of a ring-and-hub network [5] which extended the
model of Ref. [6] to include congestion costs on the central hub or hubs.
The quickest route across the network is easy to determine when you are
the only agent on the network. However this is rarely the case in real-world
problems, where you have multiple agents all trying to minimise the time/cost
of traversing the network. When this happens you see congestion at the major
shortcut points, e.g. the random links in small world networks, or at the major
hubs in a scale free network. Once the connection becomes congested it no
longer represents the shortest pathway across the network. Agents observe this
and modify their behaviour, often creating a new congestion points elsewhere
on the network. Congestion arises then not solely as a result of the network
topology, rather it occurs as a result of the dynamic interplay between the
structure of the network and the decisions of the agents using it. In this paper
we introduce a model for describing the effects of agents’ decisions on the
creation of congestion within a ring-and-hub topology, this work extends the
model introduced by Ashton et al by introducing decision-making agents onto
the network. Agents use their own strategies to make inductive decisions about
the future behaviour of the system in order to find the cheapest pathway across
it. Our model lends itself to real life problems such as communication across
social networks, flow of data across the internet, traffic flow, or any situation
where competing agents have to navigate a network where congestion is a
factor. This model is constructed in an attempt to understand how agents on
centralised networks respond to a dynamic pricing structure, and the effect
that these charges have on congestion.
2 System Set-up
The simulation consists of N agents and a central hub of capacity L. Each
agent is connected to their nearest neighbours by an undirected link of unit
length. These links form a peripheral pathway around the outside of the net-
work. Each agent also have the possibility of being connected to another point
on the network through the central hub. If this pathway exists it is known
as the hub pathway and the number of these in the network is defined to be
λ. Through these sets of connections the agents form a combined ring-and-
hub topology, i.e. a hub and spoke network. Each agent A(i) must transport
himself (e.g. a car containing himself, or a message) from one location on the
network to a randomly selected final destination A(j) at another point on the
network. If the agent A(i) is connected to the central hub they have the op-
tion of using this resource with an associated cost Ccentral, or they can use the
peripheral pathway constructed from connections between nearest neighbours
at a cost of Cout. The goal of each agent is to minimise the cost of transporting
the object/data to its final destination.
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Fig. 1. Our model network with the nodes connected to nearest neighbours around
the outside and the central hub located in the middle. Agent A(i) is randomly
connected to another point on the network A(j) and the costs of the transport are
shown as Ccentral, Coutside.
There are costs associated with each decision and these are listed below in
equation (1), where the cost of using the central hub is a variable cost that is
dependent both on the actions of the agents within the group and the capacity
of the hub. The central hub has a finite capacity given by L, if this capacity is
reached then the hub is congested and a congestion charge cc (time/money)
is imposed on all traffic through the hub. There are many ways to implement
a congestion charge depending on the system under investigation, but for the
purposes of this paper we will choose a digital cost structure (as shown in figure
1b), where each connection to the hub is 1
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a unit length and the congestion
charge only applies when > L agents use the central hub. We select a digital
price structure for the congestion charge for two reasons, firstly when designing
systems with a dynamic pricing component, a digital structure is far easier
to implement than an analogue one, as it is a simple on/off switch like the
congestion charge in central London. Secondly, a digital structure captures the
elements of many real world congestion problems, such as the movement of
road traffic, which undergoes an abrupt transition from free flowing to stop-go
traffic at a critical density [7].
In contrast to the variable pricing structure of the central hub, the cost of using
the peripheral pathway is determined only by the number of nodes traversed
and as such is a fixed cost. There is a cost of β = 1 associated with travelling
between two neighbouring nodes on the network. The transport costs across
the network are then given by;
Ccentral=


2
(
β
2
)
if Ncentral ≤ L
cc+ β if Ncentral > L
Cout=nβ (1)
Where n is the number of nodes traversed, cc is the congestion charge, which
can vary between 0 and N/2, and β is the standard or unit cost. The con-
nections between nodes on the network are undirected links of unit length;
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Fig. 2. (a) Digital pricing structure for the central hub with capacity L. A standard
cost of β = 1 is applied before the capacity reached. After capacity is reached the
cost of using the hub increases by fixed amount cc. (b) The m = 2 set of strategies
allocated to agents in this simulation. Each column represents a different realisation
of the history string, with rows containing the actions. Action 1 corresponds to using
the central hub, and action 0 is to take the peripheral path.
hence data can travel either way round the network to its destination. The
maximum distance an object can travel is then N/2. The connections to the
central hub are directed and unique to the agent, hence only agents directly
connected to the hub are able to use it. If an agent is not connected to the
central hub, they are forced to use a peripheral pathway.
In order to determine the quickest/cheapest route, each agent is randomly
assigned s = 2 strategies from a pool of binary strategies. For m = 2 these
strategies take the form (1011), where each digit in the strategy sequence cor-
responds to an action associated with the history string of the same position
(11, 10, 01, 00) i.e. for history string (10) we have action 0. Here action 1 de-
notes a decision to use the central hub, whilst 0 corresponds to not using the
central hub. The strategy table (shown in figure 2) is self-similar in nature,
and for every node visited by the global history string, another column of the
table is accessed to reveal differences in strategies.
At each time-step in the game every agent with a connection to the central
hub must make a decision whether or not to use the central hub, the decision
can be summarized as “through the middle, or around the outside?” Their
decision is dictated by the relative success of the two strategies that they
hold. The agents make their decision based on the action associated with
their highest scoring strategy, and if the two strategies are tied then the agent
will flip a coin to decide. If the agent chooses action 1 and Ccentral < Cout
then the agent has made the correct decision and the success of their strategy
will be reinforced with an increase in it’s virtual score of +1 points, else if
Cout > Ccentral then the strategy will be penalised by -1 points. The reverse
applies if the agent’s high scoring strategy predicts action 0. At time t = t+1,
using the newly updated strategies, the agent again makes a decision about
the cheapest pathway to use, and the above process is repeated.
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3 Results and Analysis for Variable Network
At the start of the simulation there are no connections to the central hub
and each agent is only connected to their nearest neighbours. At each time-
step a randomly chosen agent is connected to the central hub such that λ =
λ+1. With this new network in place, the strategies and destinations are then
reassigned amongst the agents and the simulation is repeated with the agents
competing to minimise their transport costs across the new network. This
process is repeated until all agents have a connection to the central hub. We
have run this simulation with N = 101 agents, a memory length of m = 2 and
s = 2 strategies assigned per agent. The central hub has a capacity given by L
and a congestion charge determined by the digital price structure shown above
in figure 2a. The simulation is run for 10,000 time-steps which constitutes one
run, with each value of λ representing the average of 1000 runs.
The global cost per agent of transportation across the network is defined as
g(λ), and is displayed in figure 3a for various values of cc in a network with
L = 40. The transport cost, is initially the same for all values of cc and starts
at g(0) ∼ 25. This value is then the cost of transporting data/objects across
the network with no connections to the central hub, and is given by g(0) = N
4
β.
As λ increases, g decreases linearly for all values of cc up to a critical point at
λ ∼ 50. The curves for the various values of cc then diverge and follow distinct
pathways. We can divide the plots into two groups; high penalty cc > 25 and
low penalty cc < 25. For the high penalty group g(λ) increases rapidly after
the critical point until the emergence of a stable state at λ ∼ 65 where g
stays relatively constant before increasing further as λ tends to N . For the
low penalty group an increase in g(λ) after the critical point is also observed,
however after this initial increase the cost of transportation across the network
again begins to fall.
Fig. 3. (a) This graph displays the results from the simulation showing the global
transport cost across the network g(λ) as a function of the number of agents con-
nected to the central hub. (b) This graph shows the probability of the central hub
being crowded (γ). Inset shows the agents success rate in predicting the cheapest
pathway across the network.
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In figure 3b we see the plot of the probability of the central hub being crowded,
γ(λ). For values of λ < 50, γ = 0 as the central hub is never overcrowded.
For the low penalty systems little or no time is spent in the γ = 0.5 state.
Whereas for high penalty systems as cc increases, the amount of time spent
in this state also increases, and when cc = 50 the system does not leave the
γ = 0.5 state. The inset of figure 3b shows the agents average success rate in
predicting the correct transport pathway across the network, which we define
to be E(λ).
We can divide the agents into two groups based on the distance that they
have to travel and the size of the congestion charge, where Nshort denotes the
average number of ‘short trip’ agents and Nlong the average number of ‘long
trip’ agents. Nlong agents have to travel a distance that is greater than cc.
Hence it is always advantageous for the long trip agents to use the central
hub irrespective of the actions of other agents. The short trip agents have a
distance to travel which is less than the size of the congestion charge. Hence the
short trip agents will want to use the central hub provided it is not congested.
However if the central hub is congested, then it will prove cheaper to use
the peripheral pathway. Thus for the Nshort agents, the correct decision is
dependent on the collective actions of the group. Because the agents’ final
destinations are distributed randomly, we get for cc < N/2;
Nshort=
(
cost of using crowded hub
cost of maximum path across network
)
Ntotal + β (2)
= 2cc+ 1 (3)
Nlong =Ntotal −Nshort (4)
=Ntotal − 2cc− 1 (5)
If cc < N/2 then there are no long trip agents and Nshort = Ntotal. Because the
size of the congestion charge remains constant, the sizes of these two groups
stays fixed throughout the duration of the game. There are then two separate
history stings associated with the game, µshort and µlong, one for each group of
agents. The agents in each group can then effectively be treated as a cohesive
unit, whose actions are jointly determined by their respective values of µ and
the initial strategy distribution amongst the agents within the group.
The game starts with λ = 0 and the hub is under-subscribed with no con-
gestion, this state will be called State I. The history string for both groups
of agents is then µlong = µshort = (0000...), where 0 denotes the global un-
crowded result. This history string only visits one node on the De Bruijn
graph (00) (figure 4a) and as such results in a compression of the strategy
space from the original pool of 16, to just two. The two strategies are then
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(0|1) and (0|0), where the first term denotes the history and the second the
agents’ action. Because the history string consists of consecutive 0’s the vir-
tual point scores for the two strategies diverge linearly over time as shown in
figure 4b. This gives rise to the state level diagram shown in figure 4c with two
states corresponding to the two different strategies (0|1) and (0|0). Because
each agent is randomly assigned s = 2 strategies, and plays the higher scoring
of the two, the populations of the levels is 3N/4 and N/4 respectively. Thus
for every link that is added to the central hub, the usage of the central hub
(N(1)) increases on average by 3/4 agents, giving us for State I;
g(λ)= (average peripheral cost)− λ(Ncentral/Ntotal)Ccentral
=
N
4
−
3λ
4
β (6)
This process continues as long as the system remains in the un-crowded state
with N(1) < L. We can then define a critical point as the point where the
system has a 50% chance of N(1) > L. Thus the critical point occurs at
λ = (4/3)L, we have N(1) = L and the system moves out of State I and into
State II. The change in state corresponds to a change in history string for
short trip agents, with µshort = (0001...). However the history string for the
long trip agents remains fixed at µlong = (0000...).
Fig. 4. (a) The path across the de Bruijn graph for State 1. (b) The corresponding
virtual points scores for the two classes of strategies used by agents to make their
decisions, (c) Equivalent levels, along with associated populations and success rates.
In State II (see figure 5a) the system visits two extra nodes (01) and (10).
Visiting the nodes has two effects, the first is that for part of the time the
central hub is crowded and a congestion charge is applied to all agents who
use it. This crowding is responsible for the increase in g(λ) that occurs after
the critical point. The increase in g(λ) is a gradual one since the probability
of residing in the State II is governed by a binomial distribution. The second
effect of the nodes is to increase the number of strategies available to the
agents, which in turn changes the number of bands in the state level diagram.
These two nodes can be thought of as providing extra degrees of freedom for
the system and as such resolves the (1xx) strategy into four new strategies
(111, 110, 101, 100). This extra resolution means that for node (10) a per-
centage of the agents that were taking action 1 before the transition are now
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taking action 0, and as such N(1) must initially be less that L in State II. The
same strategy splitting effect occurs for the (0xx) group of strategies, which
if s = 1 would cancel the above effects and the system would move out of this
state. However because s = 2 the distribution of strategies is top heavy for
the strategies with (00 | 1), the splitting of strategies instead acts to reduce
N(1) and a buffer is created.
Fig. 5. (a) de Bruijn graph for State II, system visits three nodes and α is the
number of times the system returns to (00) node. (b) State level diagram for State
II, the wide bands represent groups of strategies with the same mean success rate.
In State II, the system traverses the de Bruijn graph in a cyclic fashion,
returning to the (00) node each time (figure 5a). However after taking this
pathway the original ordering of the strategies is different. The system then
resets itself by returning to the (00) node α times. As λ increases the value of
α decreases, from α = 3 initially to α = 1 immediately before leaving State
II. This change in α reduces the number of unique levels in the state diagram,
and alters the make-up of the strategies within them (figure 5b).
The wider bands in the state level diagram represent sets of strategies which
have the same average success rate over time (En), but vary about En during
the cycle around the graph. The strategies will vary about this mean, but on
2
3
of the nodes they will have equal virtual point scores. On these nodes agents
that hold two strategies from within the same band are forced to flip a coin
in order to decide which strategy to play. If the agent’s two tied strategies
make the same predictions for the particular node, then it does not increase
the disorder in the system. However if the two strategies make different pre-
dictions, flipping the coin does influence their action and this agent falls into
a new group of agents which we shall call the undecided group denoted by
N(1
2
). There are thus three elements in the system, N(1) the number of agents
choosing action 1 with certainty, N(0) the number of agents choosing action
0 with certainty and N(1
2
) the number of agents whose decision is determined
by chance. Because the long trip agents effectively only have two non-equal
strategies to play, the N(1
2
) agents come exclusively from the short trip pop-
ulation. The relative sizes of these three groups determines which state the
system will reside in and hence the probability that the central hub is crowded.
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Fig. 6. ((a) de Bruijn graph for the intermediate state between States II and III.
Probability of visiting the (11) node given by Pperturb. (b) The histogram reveals
the existence of intermediate states of γ for 60 < λ < 65.
A global ‘1’ result on the (10) node will shift the system out of State II and
into State III. In order to determine the probability of this occurring we need
to consider the size of the N(1) and N(1
2
) components for this state. We will
look specifically at the α = 1 distribution since this is the last cycle the system
visits before moving into State III. Analysis of ψn and the band levels in figure
5c gives us, N
(
1
2
)
= 8N
64
. If N(1
2
) is greater than the difference between the
resource level and N(1), then the system will be randomly ’kicked out’ of the
stable cycle in State II and will briefly reside in State III before returning. This
process is shown in figure 6a. If we define the buffer as, ∆ = L−N(1)−N
(
1
2
)
.
We can then use binomial probability distribution to determine the likelihood
that the system will be ’randomly’ perturbed into a new state. Doing this
gives us;
Ppeturb =
N( 1
2
)∑
k=∆
P (k | N
(
1
2
)
) =
N( 1
2
)∑
k=∆
N
(
1
2
)
!
k!(N
(
1
2
)
− k)!
(
1
2
)k (
1−
1
2
)N( 1
2
)−k
The effect of the N(1
2
) agents is to act as noise which can randomly perturb
the system into intermediate states between States II and III, these can be
seen clearly in figure 6b for 0.25 < γ < 0.5.
Each new state that the system visits has a unique cost, and gamma associated
with it. These can be determined by careful analysis of the state level diagrams,
which gives us a general expression for the global transport cost;
g(λ)=
i∑
n=1
g(λ)nP (λ)n (7)
where g(λ)n is the cost associated with State n, and P (λ)n is the probability
of residing in this state. Elsewhere we will present a detailed analysis of these
states and the transitions between them. Including a discussion of the high γ
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states which occur in the remaining part of the parameter space.
4 Summary
This paper has shown that the agents in the network can be divided into two
groups, where the size of each group is determined by the maximum path
length across the network and cc. The addition of new links to the network
brings about two main processes that serve to drive the system into new states.
The first of these processes is the addition of N(1) agents who use the central
hub with certainty. The second process is a more unpredictable one with the
addition of ‘random’ N(1
2
) agents to the system. If N(1)+N(1
2
) > L, there is a
finite probability that the N(1
2
) agents will randomly perturb the system into
new states, but these states are not permanent. However for any node on the
graph if N(1) > L, the change is permanent and a new state is formed that
has a unique and ‘predictable’ cycle associated with it. This new state and the
associated cycle around the de Bruijn graph has the effect, when compared
with the previous state, of changing the history strings for the Nshort agents,
which in turn re-orders the agents strategies. This re-ordering of strategies
reduces the number of short trip agents using the central hub, and in effect
acts as a buffer to produce stable states in the system. Thus the system moves
between different states as the connections to the central hub are varied, each
of these states has a unique behaviour associated with it and some states may
be more desirable than others depending on the goal of the system designer.
Our results show that whilst some states remain robust to external influences,
it is possible to make large scale changes in efficiency with minor adjustments
to network structure or pricing.
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